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Jonathan M. Weinberg 
The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy 
Abstract 
Must philosophers incorporate tools of experimental science into their meth-
odological toolbox? I argue here that they must. Tallying up all the resources that 
are now part of standard practice in analytic philosophy, we see the problem that 
they do not include adequate resources for detecting and correcting for their own 
biases and proclivities towards error. Methodologically sufficient resources for er-
ror-detection and error-correction can only come, in part, from the deployment of 
specific methods from the sciences. However, we need not imagine that the result-
ing methodological norms will be so empirically demanding as to require that all 
appeals to intuition must first be precertified by a thorough vetting by teams of sci-
entists. Rather, I sketch a set of more moderate methodological norms for how we 
might best include these necessary tools of experimental philosophy. 
Keywords: Experimental philosophy, Armchair philosophy, Philosophical meth-
odology, Intuitions, Philosophical expertise, Epistemic demandingness. 
1. What is an armchair, that one might want to sit in it? 
About a decade and a half after papers started being published under 
the flag of “experimental philosophy”, it seems to me that most philosophers 
who have a view about such work, think that it can perhaps be of at least 
some modest benefit to the profession, or that it is, at worst, a bit of a dis-
traction.
1
 But my impression is also that most philosophers think that ex-
perimental philosophy is not especially relevant to what they do, and is 
something that one can take or leave as one chooses, perhaps according to 
one’s metaphilosophical tastes. I want to push the more ambitious line, 
however, that experimental philosophy (henceforth “x-phi”, according to 
recent usage) is in fact a necessary addition to our field’s methodological 
resources. I will argue that here by contending that our armchair resources 
– in a sense to be expanded on shortly – are too impoverished to satisfy the 
 
1 Although there are some important dissenters, e.g., Deutsch (2010), Cappelen (2012), I 
will not be engaging with them here. See my (2014) for a brief response. 
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needs of philosophical inquiry on the whole, and that moreover x-phi’s tools 
can turn many of the sorts of screws that our armchair tools cannot touch. 
Let us start, then, by considering the question: just what can be done from 
the armchair? I will be construing armchairhood both broadly and gener-
ously here, to try to capture the resources commonly deployed in current 
analytic philosophical practice. We can start with Timothy Williamson’s 
gloss of armchair methods as follows: 
Every armchair pursuit raises the question of whether its methods are adequate 
to its aims. The traditional methods of philosophy are armchair ones: they consist of 
thinking, without any special interaction with the world beyond the chair, such as 
measurement, observation or experiment would involve. (Williamson 2007, p. 1) 
This seems a good start at capturing what philosophers mean by work-
ing from the armchair, but I think we can unpack a bit further.
2
 Contem-
plating what sorts of resources do seem to get drawn on regularly across a 
wide range of the sorts of (mostly analytic) philosophy today that might be 
considered to be operating from the armchair, one can see that the re-
sources generally taken to be fair game include at least the following:  
• common sense and similar sorts of facts available to informal observation, both 
perceptual and intellectual (often, but not always, under the term “intuition”); 
• the received general knowledge of the college-educated population, including 
even some fairly sophisticated scientific results so long as they are sufficiently 
well-entrenched at this point, such as the general outlines of modern physics 
and evolutionary biology. As a rough rule of thumb: it’s the kind of scientific 
results that don’t require you to offer any citations on their behalf when you 
appeal to them, or just by referencing a name (e.g., “Darwin”) or a title (e.g., 
“Special Relativity”) without more specific reference. 
We should also add the following that are standard components of phil-
osophical training: 
• the history of philosophy, including the track records of various techniques and 
approaches, as well as an ample stockpile of potentially useful distinctions and 
technical terms; 
• all of mathematics and formal logic, as needed; 
• a well-elaborated theory of argumentation, including a fairly well-theorized set 
of norms both positive (e.g., select premises that plausibly will be granted by 
an opponent; make clear how your premises collectively necessitate your con-
clusion) and negative (e.g., don’t argue in a circle, don’t confuse use and men-
 
2 What follows should be taken as generally of a piece with the sort of “a posteriori arm-
chair” defended recently in Nolan (2015). 
THE METHODOLOGICAL NECESSITY OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY  25 
tion). This also includes norms for responding to arguments (e.g., what consti-
tutes a successful counterexample). 
Now, in many areas of philosophy, it is clear that even this ample set of 
resources does not exhaust what is commonly taken to be legitimate to 
draw upon. The philosophies of the specific sciences, to take an obvious 
example, will of course call upon a much more extensive and fine-grained 
mastery of current scientific results and controversies. Williamson acknowl-
edges this observation about current philosophical methodology as well, 
when he “raises no objections to the idea that the results of scientific experi-
ments are sometimes directly relevant to philosophical questions: for exam-
ple, concerning the philosophy of time” (Williamson 2007, p. 6). Or consider 
the philosophies of the arts, in which we frequently see very sophisticated 
appeals to and engagements with matters like art history, music or film the-
ory, or the technical practices of performers. It is not controversial that a 
topic-specific “philosophy of X” must engage with the specific contours of X. 
While these resources serve as key enrichments to the armchair resources 
enumerated above, they are not used in quite the same way. Typically (albe-
it not exclusively) the philosopher is purely a consumer of these resources, 
and is not adding back to them; and it is highly rare (though, again, not un-
heard of) for philosophers to draw on these resources outside of the philos-
ophy of X. For example, contemporary physics shows up a lot in philoso-
phy of physics (of course), and a bit in some particular debates in meta-
physics, and hardly anywhere else. So, although none of this kinds of work 
seems legitimately called armchair philosophy, nonetheless we can still see 
even here a kind of domain-specific extensions to the armchair.  
Let’s call the above picture of the analytic philosophical toolbox the cur-
rent analytic methodological consensus (CAMC). Experimental philosophy 
looks to upset that consensus, in large part by incorporating not just select 
results but also methods from the sciences, especially the social sciences, di-
rectly into the core tools, and not as a domain-specific extension. Now, that’s 
reason enough for folks to be upset by it – no consensus is ever disturbed 
without its being disturbing – but I worry that there is a lot of confusion 
around the profession as to both the nature of the intended disruption, and 
the motives behind it. I aim to clarify both here, and in doing so, hopefully 
make clearer just what the nature of x-phi’s challenge to CAMC really is, 
and why even fairly traditionally-minded philosophers should perhaps look 
to embrace it nonetheless. 
Before turning to that challenge, though, I want to note that CAMC 
does already admit of one kind of experimental philosophy as unproblemat-
ic, as offering no such disturbance of the methodological status quo. I think 
the profession on the whole is used to the idea that where philosophy bor-
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ders other disciplines – and there are many such borders – there will be much 
good, constructive work that fully inhabits both sides of the disciplinary di-
vide. There is excellent work that is both philosophy of language and lin-
guistics, both history of philosophy (as part of philosophy more generally) 
and history of ideas (as part of history more generally), both philosophy of 
physics and the very edge of theoretical physics itself. Some experimental 
philosophy work is intended to contribute to the philosophy of psychology 
by adding to our knowledge of philosophically-interesting pieces of scien-
tific psychology. Joshua Knobe is a prominent champion of this particular 
variety of x-phi (forthcoming). The work is not meant to engage with stand-
ing debates about knowledge or intention or causation as such, but rather 
to help us understand how human minds engage with these notions. We 
can understand Knobe-style x-phi as an instance of the CAMC, in which not 
just psychology’s results but also psychology’s tools are recruited, as a legit-
imate domain-specific extension.
3
  
But when philosophers are not doing cognitive science or the philosophy 
of psychology (or the psychology of philosophy), of what use or relevance is 
x-phi to them? To the extent that x-phi offers only a contribution to one 
specific subfield of philosophy, it also to that extent may often be legiti-
mately ignored by those doing work outside that subfield. It can be recruit-
ed when relevant, as philosophers often recruit useful ideas across sub-field 
boundaries (e.g., when epistemologists debating contextualism redeploy 
machinery originally from the philosophy of language). Yet it would not need 
not do so. X-phi-understood-as-cog-sci is of no more general methodological 
relevance to other parts of philosophy than, say, current methods of physics 
are outside of contemporary philosophy of physics.  
To bring into view the more general relevance of x-phi, beyond its being 
a contribution to cognitive science, let me springboard off of a recent ad-
monition for methodological reflection from Williamson. While his Philos-
ophy of Philosophy opens with the gloss on the armchair we adverted to 
above, towards the end of that book, he urges armchair philosophers that 
they “must do better” by attending closely to the linguistic aspects of our 
philosophical activities, on a model of how scientists must understand the 
tools that they deploy in their investigations: 
 
3 There is a tangled issue here regarding the relationship between experimental philoso-
phy and naturalistic philosophy, especially where philosophy-of-X and highly-theoretical-X 
shade into each other, as happens with some frequency in the philosophy of physics and the 
philosophy of cognitive science (see, e.g., Prinz 2007). I don’t take the philosophers in these 
areas to be the target of my paper here; I expect they would consider themselves to be operat-
ing outside the armchair already. 
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Philosophers who refuse to bother about semantics, on the grounds that they 
want to study the non-linguistic world, not our talk about the world, resemble scien-
tists who refuse to bother about the theory of their instruments, on the grounds that 
they want to study the world, not our observation of it. Such an attitude may be 
good enough for amateurs; applied to more advanced inquiries, it produces crude 
errors. Those metaphysicians who ignore language in order not to project it onto the 
world are the very ones most likely to fall into just that fallacy, because their care-
lessness with the structure of the language in which they reason makes them insensi-
tive to subtle differences between valid and invalid reasoning. (Williamson 2007, 
pp. 284-285) 
Perhaps optics is not part of astronomy proper; nonetheless, a decent as-
tronomer had better know a lot about how light interacts with lenses, mir-
rors, and the atmosphere (or radio waves, and so on). And thus the experi-
mentalist can argue on a closely parallel line that, even if x-phi is fundamen-
tally psychological, its philosophical relevance will extend far beyond cogni-
tive science and the philosophy of psychology itself: 
Philosophers who refuse to bother about the empirically-discoverable workings 
of our minds, on the grounds that they want to study the extramental world, not our 
thought or concepts about that world, resemble scientists who refuse to bother 
about the theory of their instruments on the grounds that they want to study the 
world, not our observation of it. Such an attitude may be good enough for amateurs; 
applied to more advanced inquiries, it produces crude errors. Those metaphysicians 
who ignore the empirical in order to preserve the ideal of methodological self-
sufficiency are the very ones most likely to fall into error, because their carelessness 
of the structure of the human mind with which they reason makes them insensitive 
to subtle differences between accurate and inaccurate observations.
4
 
The danger here is not just one of the possibility of error – we are surely 
already aware of all sorts of ways in which philosopher can and do make 
mistakes, and we didn’t need x-phi to teach us merely that philosophers are 
fallible – but, rather, the threat of stumbling into unnoticed and heretofore 
unnoticeable pitfalls, ones invisible to our current methodological resources. 
For what CAMC can’t do, even when we include its domain-specific exten-
sions, is sufficiently detect its own susceptibilities to bias and error. To be 
clear, this is not an across-the-board problem for the CAMC. In particular, 
I have no evidence to offer that would cast doubt on the formal sciences’ 
current adequacy to detecting its own threats of error. For over the centu-
ries those methods have developed elaborate and sophisticated practices of 
formalization, of laying bare one’s axioms and rules of inference and the 
like, of articulated proofs and indeed the rigorous checking of such proofs. 
 
4 I am drawing liberally here from my (2009). 
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I similarly have no doubts to raise about methods within the history of phi-
losophy, with its practices of scholarship and archival work, for example. 
2. Experimental philosophy and the challenge of inappropriate sensitivity 
My concerns are primarily about the first item on my ledger of CAMC 
resources: what are the deficiencies in our ordinary capacities of ordinary 
observation and intuition, and common-sense generalization, such that x-
phi can at least in principle improve on them? 
Proponents of this challenge to the methodological self-sufficiency of 
the armchair often point to vectors of inappropriate sensitivity. We want the 
deliverances of these capacities to track whatever really does make a differ-
ence between, say, knowing and not-knowing, or free actions and unfree, 
but at the same time we do not want them to be driven by factors outside of 
the relevant philosophical truths. In general, factors like demographics, or-
der of presentation, subtle and philosophically-irrelevant shifts in wording, 
or even the font that a case is presented in – these are all factors that, while 
they do not seem likely to be good candidates for inclusion in our best the-
ories of knowledge, agency, moral goodness and the like, they are all none-
theless factors for which there is growing evidence that our intuitions are 
problematically sensitive.
5
  
Let me be clear about what the challenge of inappropriate sensitivity is 
not. First, as noted above but worth emphasizing, it is not the same as mere 
fallibility – and the methods advocated in experimental philosophy are not 
themselves infallible, after all. Any proposed piece of methodological ad-
vice, “don’t trust any fallible sources” will surely run into both a wildly over-
generalized skepticism (since near enough to all human epistemic resources 
are fallible), as well as self-defeat (since the source of that advice will surely 
itself be fallible).  
Relatedly, the challenge of inappropriate sensitivity does not require 
imposing the hyperbolic, skeptical requirement that all methodological re-
sources be non-circularly calibrated, as e.g. some have worried is the case 
with Cummins (1998). The problem is not that the resources of CAMC 
merely lack for some sort of independent certification, while otherwise per-
haps being perfectly fine; the problem is that we have actual positive reason 
to think that they have flaws that are beyond their collective ability to correct. 
 
5 See Buckwalter et al. (2012) for a number of instances of such results. I should note that, 
while some have not replicated well in the interim, such as my own (2001), many other results 
have been replicated successfully and indeed extended, such as those of Machery et al. (2004), 
Swain et al. (2008), and Feltz and Cokely (2009). 
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Moreover, it is not any sort of self-hating philosopher’s appeal to a blink-
ered scientism. The argument isn’t, “CAMC does not include some meth-
odological characteristic necessary to count as science, and for that reason it 
is inadequate”. It is not a matter of imposing an alien methodological crite-
rion onto philosophy, one that philosophy has no reason of its own to en-
dorse. The challengers presume that successfully tracking the truth about 
matters philosophical is a value that is internal to philosophy, and indeed 
central to many forms of it.
6
 The reason that experimental philosophers agi-
tate for a larger incorporation of scientific methods into philosophy at large 
is not simply – not at all – because they qualify for some magic status of 
“science!”. We take ourselves instead to have good reason to think that 
those methods are the best available to address the specific deficiencies ob-
served within CAMC. I will illustrate this point in terms of two large classes 
of such deficiencies: cognitive diversity, and subtle contextual effects. 
Cognitive diversity will be obscured by our own natural sampling of 
those who are like us, and self-selection within the profession. There is the 
famous story of the film critic Pauline Kael, acknowledging the biased sam-
ple of her own professional world in the context of the 1972 election: “I live 
in a rather special world. I only know one person who voted for Nixon. 
Where they are I don’t know. They’re outside my ken. But sometimes when 
I’m in a theater I can feel them”. In the context of a presidential election, 
all of us can get good feedback as to how far our own local communities 
may diverge from the larger body politic, and Kael may well have been 
more sensitive to such divergences than your typical intellectual, due to that 
time in the theaters, and to her copious acute attention to the popular cin-
ema. In contrast, your typical philosopher, considering a standard (and, 
standardly, at least a little bit weird) thought-experiment, will likely be more 
at sea as to whether they are or are not on the same wavelength as any larg-
er community. It is easy for most of us to be out of tune with the folk in 
general, despite interactions such as those in the classroom that may give us 
the illusion of receiving adequate feedback (Stich and Weinberg 2001). But 
for that matter, it is not that hard for one sub-community of philosophers 
to get itself out of sync with the rest of the profession. Anecdotally, it seems 
to me that some famous thought-experiments elicit a much wider array of 
responses even in the profession than their original authors may have sus-
pected, such as Swampman, the fake barn, and high stakes/low stakes bank 
 
6 However, those whose metaphilosophies that do not traffic in, or even oppose, thinking 
of philosophy in such terms will also rightly not find much of relevance to them in experi-
mental philosophy’s methodological challenge. 
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cases. It would be good to be able to get beyond anecdotes, though – be-
tween-philosopher variation would be a good direction for future research! 
And subtle contextual effects like framing, order, font choice, and so on 
are, well, subtle, and operate largely unconsciously. They are thus invisible 
to introspection, and not likely to be revealed to unaided, unsystematic ob-
servation. They are just the sort of thing that it took experimental psychol-
ogy to uncover in the first place, after all. Even should some philosopher 
notice such effects, they will often lack a clear enough evidential basis to 
persuade the profession of it more widely, and at best it will remain a de-
bated and debatable point, as so many attempted “explainings away” of 
unwanted intuitions remain, in the literature. And we should expect that 
many armchair conjectures as to the underlying causal working of these 
case verdicts will be mistaken, as CAMC just does not have the kind of re-
solving power to separate subtle effects that are really there from those that 
might be merely a mistaken conjecture on the part of a theorist.
7
  
So these two general kinds of error vectors will by and large lie beyond 
the power of CAMC to detect and correct. Yet scientific methods can over-
come these problems largely by looking for them directly. We can design 
studies to sample deliberately across a broad range of participants, and any 
hypothesized differences can be looked for directly. Many subtle effects can 
be controlled for by good experimental design as well. For example, order 
effects can be controlled for by presenting sets of cases in different orders 
to different participants, as is fairly standard scientific practice. Moreover, 
these methods allow us to use statistics in order to help pick out real effects 
from illusory ones. 
A further complication here is that the armchair can drastically misreckon 
its own degree of competence. Precisely because we are susceptible to all 
sorts of biases and errors that we typically cannot detect using only arm-
chair resources, we will tend to overestimate our capacity for detecting and 
correcting for errors. Biases detected and corrected for will count positively 
in our estimate of that capacity, but those that are not detected in the first 
place will, for that very reason, not be able to figure into that evaluation.  
A nice illustration of this problem comes from the literature debating x-
phi itself. A number of philosophers have claimed that, while the sort of un-
dergraduate or otherwise non-specialist subjects in x-phi studies may dis-
play a diverse set of responses or be susceptible to funny sorts of unconscious 
effects, we should nonetheless expect expert philosophers to display much 
greater uniformity and immunity to such effects (Ludwig 2007; Hales 2006; 
 
7 See Ichikawa (2009) for an exploration of some of the issues around the topic of explain-
ing away intuitions. 
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Williamson 2005). Where such a line might be offered merely as a hypothe-
sis for consideration and investigation, I would have no objections to it. But 
many have presented it as a claim so clearly true, that at a minimum it 
pushes the burden of proof all the way over on to the would-be critic of 
CAMC. And yet this claim of philosophical expertise turns out, for starters, 
to be not particularly consistent with the general scientific findings on ex-
pertise (Weinberg et al. 2010). And in fact, a growing set of results looking 
specifically at whether philosophers are immune to the threats of diversity 
and unconscious biases have by and large disconfirmed the key claims of 
this expertise defense.
8
 I expect that there will be some zones where philo-
sophical training does prove to screen off some of these error vectors. But 
we will only be able to uncover them by the careful application of the 
methods of the empirical sciences – that is, by abandoning CAMC and do-
ing a fair amount of x-phi. 
Now, some readers might have been impatient since section 1 to object 
that I have left out some key resources that belong to CAMC. And it would 
not surprise me if that were so. Any such unfortunate omissions on my part 
should, however, be measured according to the sorts of error vectors just 
canvassed. Can these potential sources of error be detected, avoided, pre-
empted, mitigated, or compensated for by means of such resources? If so, 
then it is a fair point, and my arguments would need to be reconsidered with 
these other resources counted in CAMC’s favor. But if not, then these further 
resources can do nothing to blunt my argument for the necessity of x-phi. 
3. A defense of modest x-phi methodological norms for philosophy 
So far, I have argued for what benefits that x-phi can at least potentially 
bring, of general methodological value: CAMC has deficiencies, in the form 
of vectors of inappropriate sensitivity, and x-phi can go some distance to-
wards wrangling those vectors under control. It is yet a further step to say 
that x-phi is methodologically necessary, though. Sometimes potential bene-
fits are not worth the expected costs, and any proposed change to our 
methodological norms would have to be subjected to a calculation of the 
expected value of that trade-off. For example, sometimes philosophers ac-
cidentally commit formal fallacies in their papers – surely rather rarely in 
this day and age, but still with greater than zero frequency, a philosopher 
will trip over a scope ambiguity or an unintentional inversion of quantifier 
 
8 See Alexander (forthcoming), Buckwalter (forthcoming), and Nado (2014) for over-
views. Key recent results include Schulz et al. (2011), Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2015), and 
Tobia et al. (2013). 
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order. Were we to adopt a norm requiring the translation all of our argu-
ments rigorously into an appropriate formal language and then doing explicit, 
axiomatized derivations, then perhaps it would reduce the number of those 
fallacious arguments, maybe even to zero. Yet it does seem that the expens-
es incurred in following such a norm would swamp the value of any such 
decrease in fallacies. (Just think of how much more painful paper refereeing 
would be!) And there are not just practical costs, but epistemic ones as 
well: even assuming (as is not terribly implausible) that any errors in formal 
derivation would be caught prior to publication, nonetheless there would 
be an increased risk in introducing errors into papers during the step of 
translating into and out of the formal calculi. We would be deprived of the 
contributions of philosophers who were otherwise insightful and skilled but 
lacking in technical chops. All in all, we might well be curtailing one vector 
of errors by introducing still worse ones. Even the biggest proponents of 
formal methods in philosophy would, I think, freely endorse the claim that 
such a “norm of universal derivation” would not be wise for philosophers 
to adopt. 
It is thus entirely appropriate to ask how any proposed change to incor-
porate x-phi into our methodological norms would fare in such a cost-
benefit analysis. How would a “norm of universal experimentation” score, 
in such terms? Actually, it would fare at least as poorly as its formal coun-
terpart, for all the same reasons mutatis mutandis. Such a norm falters upon 
the uneven distribution of the relevant aptitudes in the profession; the in-
creased risk of error at the stage of operationalization and design of materi-
als when trying to test those claims that are not especially amenable to ex-
perimental treatment; even higher practical costs, since it is generally much 
more expensive to run a good study with adequate power, than it is to work 
out a formal proof; and so on. 
We have done fairly well with more moderate norms for the operation 
of formal tools in the philosophical workshop, and these well-implemented 
philosophical tools could thus serve as models for the installation of exper-
imental tools there as well. While we do not require across-the-board for-
mal derivations, we do possess a reasonably good sense about what sorts of 
inferential steps may be so tricky as to benefit from a more mathematical 
treatment. For example, a paper claiming a non-obvious entailment from 
even a small but moderately complicated set of propositions with, say, iter-
ated modal operators, or even just a handful of nested quantifiers of first-
order logic, will likely be required to include at least enough machinery of 
proof to make the entailment perspicuous. And of course we have usefully 
entrenched norms as to how such proofs are to be presented and notated, 
and the success of such norms is scaffolded by the inclusion of logic courses 
in nearly all graduate programs in philosophy today, with substantially 
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more mathematical training readily available for those who find it relevant 
to their own projects. In short, we have a good working understanding of 
where logical tools can be helpful, both where we may be prone to various 
sorts of errors without its aid, and how to use it to overcome those liabili-
ties; we have conventions for how to report on the operation of those tools 
in our publications; and we have educational practices and expectations in 
place to make sure that this understanding and conventions are widespread. 
Many x-phi norms more moderate than “universal experimentation” can 
follow that model. We can draw heavily from scientific psychology, aided 
where necessary by “negative program” x-phi, to learn where unaided hu-
man cognition may be unacceptably susceptible to error when engaging in 
philosophical argumentation. For a great many such potential foibles, good 
social sciences methodology will already offer excellent resources for over-
coming them. As noted above, while CAMC offers practically no resources 
for addressing error vectors like order effects, or outlier effects, especially 
when intensified by motivated cognition, it is nonetheless very easy to con-
trol for order in an experimental design, and outliers can similarly be easily 
detected, so long as samples are gathered well. (Not that this would totally 
get rid of these problems, especially motivated cognition, which has proved 
an incredibly thorny problem – probably nothing could do so, and indeed the 
total removal of any source of error is probably a Cartesianly unachievable 
demand. What we are looking to show here is that there could be norms 
that incorporate experimental philosophy more generally into philosophical 
practice, where the expected benefits exceed the costs. In this particular 
spot, even mitigating the threat of motivated cognition would be a signifi-
cant benefit, even if it falls unfortunately far short of totally eliminating it.) 
So the first set of norms to consider that would require experimental 
methodological interventions would be targeted specifically to conditions 
where we expect CAMC’s resources to fall short, on analogy with our 
norms for requiring formal methodological interventions. That analogy 
breaks down somewhat when we consider that such norms would be par-
ticularly demanding when those expectations have been well-confirmed by 
the relevant sorts of empirical investigations (and such norms would be ac-
cordingly relaxed when such investigations disconfirm any such prior ex-
pectations of susceptibility to error; see Mortensen and Nagel forthcom-
ing). The particular sorts of vectors to be checked would likely vary with 
the target concepts, in accord with the state of the art of our knowledge 
about them; for example, a philosopher looking to retail a free will attribu-
tion case would want to check for possible variation according to introver-
sion/extroversion of the attributor, since there are robust results indicating 
the existence of such an error vector in this domain (Feltz and Cokely 
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2009), but there might not be a need to do so with knowledge attributions at 
this time. 
Another norm to consider might be summarized, “practice good defen-
sive x-phi”. When a philosopher wants to put significant argumentative 
weight on a specific verdict about a novel case, especially one that has not 
yet been empirically investigated at all, perhaps that philosopher should be 
required to do some very preliminary, and indeed even fairly superficial 
work, just as a check on the most common sorts of error vectors – even in 
the absence of any specific, positive expectation of a susceptibility to error at 
that particular locus. If the costs of doing x-phi comes down (see below), it 
should not be burdensome to run a few different variations of any such case, 
considered in different orders against perhaps a standardized set of anchor 
cases, and checked across a reasonably diverse subject pool. (I would note 
in particular that this would require nothing at all complicated in terms of 
statistics.) While such quick self-checks would not be taken as any sort of 
definitive demonstration that the desired verdict was the verdict about the 
case, nonetheless the philosopher offering the case could rightly feel in-
creased confidence that the work was shielded from some of the more com-
mon sorts of errors.  
There are other kinds of norms we will need to consider adopting as 
well, beyond just those encouraging or mandating the application of exper-
imental tools. Our professional educational and training norms may also 
need revision. Just as we require all our PhD’s to be conversant in logic but 
expect only a few to become specialists in it, I suspect that our profession 
would be best served with a universal minimum plus support for wide 
range of more advanced levels of training. Some philosophers who decide 
they need more advanced experimental tools should also have the option of 
pursuing collaboration with specialists in the social sciences who are al-
ready masters of those methods, as is already the case with a great many 
highly successful philosopher-and-psychologist collaborations in x-phi. There 
would be at least two important further consequences of such a norm: first, 
as a larger slice of the profession gains requisite competence in various sci-
entific methodologies, the practical costs of implementing these norms will 
decrease. The burden being placed on the profession would be distributed 
across more backs, and would thus be lighter for all bearing it. Second, as 
we increase both the number of philosophers with any competence in this 
area, and the average competence of those that do, we will see an accompa-
nying boost in the quality of the experimental work being done, and deeper 
benches of referees for journals to help keep the quality high, and improving. 
And thus the methodological costs of such x-phi norms will also go down, 
should such educational norms be adopted, because we will face an ever-
lower risk of new errors being introduced by the experimentalists themselves.  
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Just as we would expect different levels of expertise to be inculcated 
across the professional population, so too might we allow these norms to be 
implemented in accord with a division of intellectual labor. It may be fine 
for many philosophers to go about their intuitive business without traffick-
ing in x-phi at all, so long as they are in good, responsive contact to other 
members of the professional community who are utilizing those methods as 
needed. In cases where no specific worries have yet been raised, we could 
probably get away with an “innocent until suspected guilty” norm, so long 
as the bar for suspicion is set fairly low. It should not take much more than 
sincere dissent about a case verdict in a thought-experiment to send both 
parties to their respective labs, or to seek out the help of their friends who 
have them. (Perhaps this norm could be abbreviated as “trust, but verify”.) 
I am just sketching some possible norms here in broad outline, and I am 
sure that there should be others to consider, both along these lines but ei-
ther more or less demanding, or concerning other aspects of the profession 
altogether (such as, say, norms of authorship credit). I hope to have made 
two points clear by this exercise, though. First, it is useful to see that there 
are a range of methodological norms we might choose to adopt, as a profes-
sion, in order to reap the benefits of x-phi but without anything like the 
counterproductive extravagance of Universal Experimentation. I think much 
resistance to x-phi originates in a fear that experimentalists must have some-
thing just that crazy in mind! It may well be that we could have a nice bit of 
methodological improvement at what would really be a rather low profes-
sional cost. Second, although the norms sketched above are all very modest, 
they nonetheless remain dangerous to any conception of philosophy as an 
armchair discipline. In our terms here: adoption of even these modest norms 
would represent a significant departure from CAMC, conceived at the level 
of the profession on the whole. Any particular armchair-residing philoso-
pher may perhaps be licensed to remain thus seated – but at best, only so 
long as they are in the right kind of responsive contact with those who are 
not. Some individual philosophers can pretty much restrict themselves to 
CAMC, so long as philosophy on the whole does not, and so long as our 
methodological resources expand in ways that facilitate our detection of 
and compensation for the sorts of errors that CAMC may be unknowingly 
prey to. 
4. On the necessity and sufficiency of modest x-phi methodological norms 
Both proponents of x-phi and defenders of the armchair may well won-
der, however, whether norms so low in cost as these could still provide 
enough benefit to warrant our adopting them, let alone necessitate such 
adoption. A more radical “experimentalist” might object that in order more 
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fully to root out these sorts of errors, we still need something strong, even if 
not quite as severe as a norm of Universal Experimentation. They might in-
sist on what we might call a norm of precertification: an intuition may only 
be relied upon if we antecedently have significant positive expectation that 
it will be immune from any established sorts of error vectors. On the other 
hand, resolute defenders of the armchair – let’s call them “cathedrists” – 
might wonder if such modest methodological changes, with accordingly 
modest benefits, would still be worth the fuss, and at such costs as steering 
some fraction of our graduate students into the requisite sorts of statistical 
training, or having to expand the referee pool for major journals to include 
persons with such training. So I will argue now that even modest norms like 
those proposed above could yield greater benefits than they may seem pri-
ma facie to these (perhaps hypothetical) resolutely partisan participants in 
these debates. But to get to that point, I first need to make some big-picture 
remarks about the nature of philosophical inquiry (or, rather, about the na-
ture of the particular kind of philosophical inquiry in which these sorts of 
intuitive methodologies under consideration are deployed). 
All methodologies have to engage with the fallibility of any human en-
deavor, and communities of inquiry have developed two distinct strategies 
for dealing with the threat of error. One strategy is to impose highly de-
manding constraints on when a method will count as having successfully 
delivered a result, such that it will count vanishingly few errors among its 
deliverances. The most obvious advantage of this kind of strategy is that one 
can place enormous trust in those results, and in turn, those results can be 
built upon in further investigations with almost no fear of being thereby led 
astray. The stockpile of certified results can be expected to grow almost en-
tirely monotonically. But this sort of approach, which I have called “M-
methodology” (Weinberg 2015), has at least two major drawbacks as well. 
First, in order to achieve this state of near-infallibility, the constraints may 
be so demanding as to be navigable by only a narrow and elite set of inves-
tigators. Second, the nature of M-methodologies can preclude delivering any 
results that it can reckon only as merely probable, even if that probability is 
rather high. To do so would allow in too great a risk of error, compounding 
as other probable-but-not-close-enough-to-certain results are also included 
among its deliverances – soon negating that very advantage that was the 
methodology’s key selling point. 
In domains where we want or even need to use more probabilistic and 
nonmonotonic forms of inquiry, we instead deploy what I termed “S-
methodologies”: we accept that a number of errors may be allowed in at 
any time, and in contrast with M-methodologies, we must invest significant 
resources in rooting them out afterwards. Of course significant measures 
will still be taken to try to keep them from creeping into our findings in the 
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first place, but we do not merely resign ourselves to the imperfections of such 
preventative cognitive defenses, and to whatever falsehoods may thus get 
past them: we take measures to find them and push them back out the door. 
Resources used for this after-the-fact detection of and correction for errors, 
I have called hope.
9
 Hope is a forward-looking methodological virtue, con-
cerning what we can do to get rid of mistakes we may already have made or 
will someday make, and it should be understood in contrast with (but not 
at all contradictory to) more traditional epistemological virtues like process 
reliability. 
We should ask, then, just how much hope any given methodology from 
the S-family should be required to have, in order to be counted as in good 
standing. Let me suggest that the normative demand for hope is propor-
tional to at least the following three factors: 
(1) the extent to which one is using an S-methodology not an M-methodology; 
(2) the actual risk of errors in one’s evidence set; 
(3) the sensitivity of one’s inferences to errors. 
Moreover, one’s resources for the mitigation of error must be able to ad-
dress the particular kinds of errors for which one is at risk. (One significant 
mistake in my earlier treatment of hopefulness was treating the demand for 
hopefulness without this sort of differentiation in terms of the particular 
risks of error.) 
In short: the more your ultimate theoretical products can be disturbed by 
errors, the more you need to take active steps to reduce the risk of such dis-
turbance by incorporating effective resources for detecting and mitigating 
those errors.
10
 
Turning now to philosophy in particular, my suspicion is that we are an 
S-methodological field, but that has a more M-methodological self-under-
standing, at least in this vicinity. We valorize proofs and deductions, and as 
noted above, training in such tools is one of the few universal sine qua nons 
of PhD programs today. And, just to be very clear, I do not mean at all to 
be diminishing the value of such tools! And I have no objections whatsoev-
 
9 In my (2007); I would note that the larger argument there, against armchair methods, ap-
peals to a principle about hope that I now think is too strong, convinced by arguments such as 
Brown (2013), Grundmann (2010), and Ichikawa (2012). This section of this paper can be con-
sidered a revision and update of that argument. 
10 There is an interesting question here as to what to do should one find oneself facing 
such a high demand for hope, but with no means available to meet that demand (Brown 2013). 
We can set that question aside here, however, since this controversy about x-phi vs. armchair 
turns on whether philosophical methodology must be expanded to include resources that are, 
in fact, readily available, namely, those of the social sciences. 
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er to raise to logic or other more mathematical subdisciplines, such as formal 
epistemology. But considering analytic philosophy more broadly, we allow 
too many sources of evidence and modes of inference that are too fallible, 
too probabilistic, to count ourselves as practicing an M-methodology. Even 
without the x-phi results, we knew our intuitions to be at least modestly fal-
lible; much philosophy draws nontrivially upon the sciences, which are al-
most definitionally S-methodological; inferential tools like reflective equilib-
rium and inference to the best explanation proceed nonmonotonically, and 
often require us to backtrack and revise. Even introspection, with its some-
time promise of first-person authority, falls short of M-methodological 
standards of immunity from error (Schwitzgebel 2008).  
Moreover, we have seen already that CAMC does not possess adequate 
resources on its own to take adequate stock of its overall actual risks of er-
ror, and a number of x-phi findings are at least highly suggestive that that 
risk is very real and as yet unmitigated. Now, perhaps these considerations 
are already enough by themselves to motivate a high requirement for hope 
in philosophical methodology. We are a field that is at risk of error, and 
that risk is higher than our current standard methods have antecedently 
reckoned, and more, it seems, than they can handle. Yet when we consider 
the nature of philosophical inference today, we can see that that demand 
must be higher still. Jennifer Nado discusses the epistemic demandingness of 
different sorts of inquiry, and argues that philosophical inquiry, which so 
often is framed in terms of exceptionless universals, is enormously demand-
ing. That is, many modes of philosophical inference – including, with re-
spect to this special issue’s topic, philosophical analysis – require a much 
higher degree of reliability than other modes of cognition, especially many 
that operate just fine for the purposes of our ordinary lives. She illustrates 
with the following useful example: 
Consider a group of 10 objects, a, b, c ... j, and two properties, F and G. Now 
consider a subject who possesses a “folk theory” devoted solely to those objects and 
their properties, on the basis of which the subject makes judgments regarding the 
applicability of F and G to the objects in the group. Suppose that, by means of this 
folk theory, our subject produces the judgments Fa, Fb, Fc ... Fj, and the judgments 
Ga, Gb, Gc ... Gj. Finally, suppose that in actuality, ~Fa and ~Gb – all other judg-
ments are correct. Out of 20 judgments, the subject has made 18 correctly – she is, 
then, a reasonably reliable judger of F-hood and of G-hood on the cases to which 
her folk theory applies. We would likely say that it is epistemically permissible for 
the subject to rely on such judgments in normal contexts.  
Suppose, however, that our subject is a philosopher; further, suppose her to be 
concerned with the nature of F-hood and of G-hood. Our subject might then come 
to hold certain theoretical claims about the nature of F-hood and G-hood on the 
basis of those initial classificatory judgments. She might, for instance, infer that eve-
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rything (in the toy universe of 10 objects) is F, that everything is G, and that if some-
thing is F then it is G. She would be wrong on all counts. The example is simple, 
but it shows that a certain principle – that the general reliability of one’s classificato-
ry judgments directly entails the general success of one’s theory-building – is clearly 
false. Generating an accurate theory is highly epistemically demanding; an otherwise 
respectable source of evidence may not suffice. (Nado 2015, pp. 213-214) 
Since Nado focuses on the reliability of the initial judgments, I need to 
transpose her example into the more future-directed key of hope. (This is 
no criticism of her arguments, but should be seen rather as supplementary 
to them.) Her hypothetical philosopher of the second paragraph could still 
actually be in fine shape, if(f!) she has the error-detecting resources to dis-
cern that she was wrong about Fa and Gb, and can thus at least down the 
road come to retract her “theoretical claims about the nature of F-hood and 
G-hood”. This is still an instance of a very high level of epistemic demand-
ingness, but imposed now upon the degree of hope that the philosopher 
must require of her practices, given that her reliability in the first place is 
only 18 out of 20, but her theories require her to be right about all 20. (It 
would also be a disaster if she erred without correction the other way: if all 
F’s necessarily are all G’s, but she has an uncorrected error that b is F but 
not G.) 
We thus find ourselves with (i) an S-methodology that (ii) is exposed to 
significant risks of error for which it lacks the means to address within its 
consensus set of methodological resources, but which (iii) uses modes of 
inference that are rather epistemically demanding, that is, which can easily 
go awry with even a small number of errors among its premises. The nor-
mative demand for hope is thus high, but unfulfilled.  
We are now ready to return to the radical experimentalist and ca-
thedrist, and their concerns about whether we should adopt anything like 
the modest x-phi norms sketched in section 3. In response to the radical 
experimentalist, who demands that any intuition about a case be estab-
lished as error-free before we can make use of it, we can see now that it 
would be a mistake to think that such errors need to be stamped out be-
forehand. That sort of precertification argument is entirely appropriate to 
M-methodologies, but not at all to S-methodologies. If I am right about hope, 
then it is perfectly kosher for our resources to correct any missteps in the 
course of inquiry after the fact, as part of our ongoing investigative journey. 
And thus, in particular, no philosopher needs to sit around waiting for the 
x-phi folks to wrap up their studies, before getting on with their work. So I 
am in agreement with Williamson when he argues that “it is a fallacy to in-
fer [from the some-time philosophical relevance of experiments] that phi-
losophy can nowhere usefully proceed until the experiments are done” 
(Williamson 2007, p. 6) – so long, however, as that philosophical work will 
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over time be in good, responsive contact with the kind of experimental work 
that may help to reveal any errors they may be prey to now without realiz-
ing it.  
If that is correct as a response to a radical experimentalist’s demand for 
precertification, then note that it also contains the seeds of a reply to the 
cathedrist as well. Hope may be all that an M-methodology needs with re-
gard to error vectors, and not precertification – but it is a robust requirement 
nonetheless. And if the above suggestions about the normative demands of 
hope are correct, then it is a requirement that falls squarely upon the philo-
sophical community, but cannot be discharged using only the resources 
made available by CAMC. Experimental philosophy will, indeed, be neces-
sary, even if only in the modest form sketched in section 3. 
5. Conclusion 
In all then, we should expect that the normative demand for hope in phil-
osophical methodology is rather high. Yet this hope cannot be sufficiently 
supplied by resources internal to CAMC. My contention here is that none-
theless modest x-phi methodological norms could go a long way to provid-
ing that hope, were they broadly incorporated into our practices. The epis-
temic demandingness of many of our modes of inference in philosophy 
make clear how a little bit of benefit in catching errors may be worth even a 
fair amount of cost, since that demandingness magnifies the costs of unde-
tected errors in the first place. And I have tried to suggest how the costs of 
implementing such norms need not be so high as some have feared, as well.  
There may be a kind of general methodological principle to explore here: 
a methodology can only be autonomous if its own risks of error are includ-
ed in its closure. CAMC has proved illusory as an autonomous set of meth-
odological resources for philosophy, precisely because its deliverances are 
susceptible to error vectors that lie outside of its own methodological am-
bit. We need a new methodological consensus, one that includes these need-
ed resources from the sciences that will allow greater error-detection and 
error-correction. 
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